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a b s t r a c t
In this paper, we examine the organization and the functioning of the Dutch electricity market. First we
describe the organization of the Dutch electricity supply chain and the role of the main market
participants including the transmission system operator, distribution system operators, program
responsible parties and metering companies. We then describe the organization of financial trading
and clearing mechanism of electricity through the organized futures exchange (The European Energy
Derivatives Exchange), and the spot market (Amsterdam Power Exchange) which includes the day-ahead
market and intra-day markets. We also detail the functioning of the imbalance market and reserve
capacity management in the Netherlands.
Through a set of numerical analysis, we provide an exploratory analysis of the APX day-ahead spot
prices and the real-time imbalance prices using electricity price data from 2002 to 2013. We observe the
price spikes both in the day-ahead and imbalance markets usually occur around 6–10 AM and 5–7 PM.
We also observe that in the imbalance market system overages happen significantly more often than
shortages pointing out that the market tends to buy more than what is demanded. This could be
explained by the risk attitude of the market participants in the imbalance market.
& 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Liberalization of the Dutch electricity market has started with
the introduction of the 1998 Electricity Act. This act provided
individual customers and suppliers with more freedom when
procuring and selling electricity, while also establishing a market
framework that is focused on reliability, sustainability and effi-
ciency. The 1998 Electricity Act established a new state-owned
entity, Tennet, to serve as the transmission system operator (TSO)
of the high voltage grid 220 kV and 380 kVð Þ. Later, the Dutch
government also unbundled the medium- and low-voltage trans-
mission grids o110 kVð Þ and generators in 2008 [7]. This resulted
in a new group of entities, called distribution system operators
(DSOs), which own and manage the medium- and low-voltage
transmission grids.
Following the introduction of the Electricity Act of 1998, the
Dutch electricity market has developed into a complex business
environment in which market parties can freely trade electricity.
The Dutch TSO, Tennet, is the main hub for all transactions and
also the owner of the Amsterdam Power Exchange (APX), which
trades and clears electricity contracts in the Day-Ahead Market.
Tennet and APX are also the parties that enable cross-border
transactions, either through auctioning of transmission capacity or
through the Day-Ahead Market. The cross-border integration of
electricity markets is currently in progress in Europe [29,2,14].
Transmission constraints in the Netherlands also play a key role
in electricity markets, especially when considering cross-border
transactions. In general, transmission constraints between differ-
ent regions or countries may have a significant impact on price
dynamics (Haldrup and Nielsen [15]), and amplify the volatility of
prices. Transmission constraints can cause different prices in
different regions and some of these regions can suffer from volatile
prices. As demand increases and capacity utilization increases as
well, more expensive plants have to be activated. This can cause
the price curve to be very steep [26,1].
In electricity markets, spot and futures contracts only function
as a preliminary schedule since the demand and supply of
electricity cannot be predicted perfectly; and hence another
market is needed for ancillary services. The reserve capacity
(imbalance) market is the marketplace where these services are
traded. These services are provided by power plants and factories
that are able to react to deviations in real-time from the pre-
liminary schedule [36]. In particular, the capacity reserve market
values the flexibility of electricity generation and consumption,
while the spot markets only value the energy content of the
transactions (Möller et al. [27]).
In this paper, we provide an overview of the functioning and
organization of the Dutch electricity markets. First we elaborate on
the liberalization of the markets followed by a discussion on
electricity generation and distribution. The discussion focuses on
the main market participants, such as the transmission system
operator, distribution system operators, program responsible par-
ties and retailers. Following that, we describe the organization
of the financial trading and clearing mechanisms for electr-
icity through the organized futures exchange, European Energy
Derivatives Exchange (ENDEX), and the spot market, the Amster-
dam Power Exchange, which includes the day-ahead and intra-day
markets. Finally, we detail the functioning of the imbalance
market and real-time reserve capacity management.
We also provide an exploratory analysis of the prices in these
markets. We observe that price spikes both in the day-ahead and
imbalance markets usually occur around 6–10 AM and 5–7 PM.
Nevertheless, the imbalance prices are significantly more volatile
than the day-ahead prices. In particular, although day-ahead
market prices do not present any downward spikes below three
standard deviations of the mean; the imbalance market does have
such spikes. In addition, a close examination of the imbalance
market reveals that the risk premium in the imbalance market for
buying electricity (relative to day-ahead market) is 4.94 EUR/MWh
while the premium for selling to the system is 4.79 EUR/MWh.
Unlike usual commodity and stock markets, the imbalance market
displays different risk-premiums for buying and selling electricity.
This is because 18% of the time the Dutch system operator
executes both an upward dispatch and a downward dispatch
during the same program time unit (PTU) which leads to diverging
buying and selling prices for that time period.
1.1. Liberalization of the Dutch electricity market
In the European Union, liberalization and restructuring of
electricity sector dominates the energy policies since the middle
of the 1990s. The overarching aim of these policies is to design an
efficient, competitive and sustainable energy market across the
European Union. Three electricity related directives (European
Commission: 1996/92; 2003/54 and 2009/72) are introduced for
the liberalization of the electricity markets in Europe [23]. The first
energy directive consisted of common rules for the reorganization
of the national markets, whereas the second directive introduces
the conditions for cross-border trading of electricity. It also orders
to separate core activities of the network companies, such as the
generation, trade and sale of energy. The third directive estab-
lished the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators to help
managing the cross-border trading of electricity.
One of the fundamental concepts of these directives is so called
unbundling, the separation of the market functions traditionally
provided by a single utility into functionally independent parts.
The policy makers decide on the degree of unbundling. Four
different types of unbundling can be distinguished: functional
unbundling, management unbundling, legal unbundling and own-
ership unbundling [17,3,10]. The Dutch practice follows the own-
ership unbundling option, which is the splitting of commercial
activities from network operations (this option is also favored by
Soares and Sarmento [28] for electricity networks). In this model,
generation companies cannot acquire shares in network operators
and similarly, network operators cannot hold shares of generation
companies. In parallel to the unbundling process, new regulations
also introduced competition to the wholesale market through
supplier selection. Starting with the large industrial consu-
mers in 1998, the demand side of the market is fully liberalized
by 2004 [6].
The Dutch TSO, Tennet, is the main hub for all transactions and
is the participant through which the government enforces and
steers the market. The distribution of electricity is handled by nine
state-owned distribution system operators (DSOs). The main
purpose of this setup is to isolate the natural monopolies from
the rest of the electricity supply chain (including production and
retailing) where the firms can freely compete. DSOs are regulated
by the government, and they are compensated based on their
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relative performance in terms of quality (interruptions in service)
and efficiency (distribution losses).
The directives of European Commission actually aim to estab-
lish a single European Energy Market. To support this objective,
firstly ERGEG (European Regulators' Group for Electricity and Gas)
was founded in 2003 and then ACER (Agency for the Cooperation
of Energy Regulators) was established in 2011. The Netherlands
also joined to these activities, and European Market Coupling
Company (EMCC) was founded in 2008 to control the flow
between regions under the principles of ITVC (Interim Tight
Volume Coupling). To further extend the coupling, seven power
exchanges (APX, Belpex, EPEX SPOT, GME, Nord Pool Spot, OMIE
and OTE) has started the project called Price Coupling of Regions
(PCR) in 2010. EMCC passed on its duty to its successor North-
Western Europe (NWE) price coupling system (including countries
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Great Britain, Belgium,
France, Germany, Luxemburg and the Netherlands) in February
2014. Finally, PCR project combined NWE and South-Western
Europe (SWE) regions by using EUPHEMIA (Pan-European Hybrid
Electricity Market Integration Algorithm) in May 2014 [25,24,9].
The impact of the liberalization efforts in the Netherlands, since the
introduction of the Electricity Act of 1998, is mostly in line with the
predictions of the classical economic theory. As predicted by the
regulation theory [30,28,20], ownership unbundling in the Nether-
lands seems to have served its purpose by creating competitive supply
and wholesale markets. In this regard, ownership unbundling seems
to have the biggest impact on the market. Streimikiene et al. [31]
provide a comprehensive analysis and review on the impact of market
liberalization on electricity prices in Europe. They find that the effect of
liberalization on electricity prices is mixed on households and
industrial consumers and depends on the country. In the Netherlands,
our analysis shows that the spot prices as well as the volatility of the
spot prices have decreased during the last 10 years. According to
World Economic Forum the Netherlands ranked 26th among 125
countries in the global energy architecture index in 2015 [42].
1.2. The Dutch electricity supply chain
The Dutch electricity supply chain has restructured after the
deregulation of the market in 1998. Today, the electricity supply
chain consists of six independent parties including the generation,
trading (program responsible parties), transmission, distribution,
metering and supplier companies, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Below we
describe the roles of system operators and program responsible
parties (PRPs) in more detail.
1.3. System operators (TSO and DSOs)
Tennet is the backbone of the Dutch electricity market and the
manager of the 110 kV, 150 kV, 220 kV and 380 kV grids. Its
network connects all regional electricity grids with each other
and with the European network. The company is a state-controlled
monopoly.
Tennet requires market participants to provide two sets of
information, a T-prognosis and an E-program, before the physical
delivery of electricity. The T-prognosis is the forecasted flow of
electricity used by Tennet to ensure grid stability. Tennet calcu-
lates the total expected electrical flows through the system, and if
the flows violate one or more of the capacity constraints on the
inter-grid connections, then it can block those requests for
transportation capacity. The E-program is the net position of each
participant in the market for each program time unit (PTU). All
E-programs need to be ratified by Tennet to ensure that demand
and supply of electricity is balanced on the grid. These programs
are also used to calculate and settle imbalance payments after the
physical delivery of electricity [34].
In addition, Tennet and the other European TSOs daily com-
municate the availability of transmission capacity. Currently,
Tennet has high voltage connections with Germany, United King-
dom, Belgium and Norway [37]. The international connection
capacity is auctioned through the Capacity Allocation Service
Company (CASC) platform. Through this platform yearly, monthly
and daily auctions are organized to allocate the cross-border
transportation capacity. Finally, Tennet controls the recognition
of program responsible parties [43].
DSOs are responsible for the construction, maintenance, man-
agement and development of the transportation and distribution
networks for electricity between the high voltage grid and the
customers. Since DSOs' are natural monopolies, their tariffs are
regulated by the Dutch government. The Dutch distribution net-
work is managed by eight DSOs which manage one or more
separate distribution grids. DSOs' performance is evaluated by the
Dutch regulation authority, the NMa.
1.4. Program responsible parties (PRPs)
A PRP is a legal entity that manages at least one physical
connection to the grid and is the party that corresponds with
Tennet. PRPs are responsible for forecasting their net demand, i.e.,
the difference between supply and demand passing through their
physical connections (E-Program), and the quantity that will be
transported through certain transmission lines from their connec-
tion (T-Prognosis). These responsibilities are called program
responsibilities, and both forecasted quantities have to be ratified
by Tennet on a daily basis [43]. There are two types of PRPs: (1) full
PRPs and (2) trading PRPs. The former ones are allowed to take
over connections of other parties, while the latter ones are only
allowed to manage their own connections. With the introduction
of the 1998 Electricity Act, all firms can buy and sell electricity in
the market without having a physical connection. However, it is
still obligatory to have a PRP permit or a contract with another
party that has a PRP permit in order to trade electricity.
All market participants with a total power consumption or
output larger than 2 MWs have to submit a T-prognosis to Tennet
one day-ahead of the physical transaction. The T-prognosis has to
be submitted before 2 PM and it is used for multiple calculations
by Tennet. PRPs also submit legally binding E-programs which are
used for the settlement of imbalances. Each market participant
with a connection has to maintain an E-program and need to
submit it one day ahead of physical delivery before 2 PM every
day. If a PRP does not submit an E-program, then its entire physical
position is settled in the imbalance market [35].
PRPs are also obliged to pay imbalance costs. These costs are
incurred during the day, whenever the realized net demand
deviates from the forecasted demand submitted to Tennet in the
E-program. For these deviations PRPs pay an imbalance cost
Fig. 1. Electricity supply chain [33].
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depending on the amount of deviation and current market price of
electricity during that specific moment. This introduces additional
financial risks for the PRPs, and therefore they need an active risk
management strategy. Finally, PRPs are also responsible for mea-
suring the electricity flowing through their connection and com-
municating these quantities to Tennet. These data, combined with
the information from Tennet are used for the settlement of
imbalances [43].
2. Financial market organization
In this section, we describe the organization of the financial
markets for trading electricity. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 are dedicated
to discussing futures and spot markets, respectively. Then, in
Section 2.3 we discuss the organization and the functioning of
the imbalance market.
2.1. ENDEX futures market
Electricity spot and futures markets play a central role in the
liberalization of the electricity markets by promoting price trans-
parency, competition and risk management [44,5,8]. The Dutch
electricity futures market was established in 1999 to support
the liberalization of the Dutch market. Futures are traded on
the organized exchange European Energy Derivatives Exchange
(ENDEX). Futures contracts traded on ENDEX are physically
settled. Hence, trading these contracts require a PRP permit since
only the PRPs are allowed for the physical delivery of electricity.
The delivery can be made to any connection in the Dutch network,
since it is considered a single market. However, there are some
physical constraints, especially in the western part of the Nether-
lands. In order to manage these transmission line constraints,
Tennet implements a congestion management system ([37,40]).
2.1.1. Type of products
The ENDEX futures market offers two standardized products
based on the delivery hours of electricity. These contracts are also
further classified according to their maturities as monthly, quar-
terly and yearly. In total there are nine futures contracts traded on
ENDEX ([11,12]).
The first contract type is a “Dutch Power Base Load” future
(DPBL). This future enables the physical delivery of 1 MWh of
electricity energy to the Dutch high voltage grid, from 00:00 on
the first day of the delivery period until 24:00 on the last day of
the delivery period. The second contract is called the “Dutch
Power Peak Load” (8–20) (DPPL8–20), which delivers 1 MWh of
electricity energy from 08:00 to 20:00 on all weekdays (including
public holidays), during the delivery period to the Dutch high
voltage grid. These individual contracts are traded for different
durations and a fixed number of months, quarters and calendars
forward (see [22] for pricing of these contracts). These contracts
expire two days before the physical delivery as illustrated in Fig. 2.
The delivery is served in the form of a day-ahead contract via the
clearing house which is owned by APX. The position is fixed, and if
a party would like to adjust its total short or long position, it can
do so on the APX spot markets.
During the last ten years Dutch electricity futures trading
reached to a significant volume and liquidity, hence providing a
strong support for the liberalization of the electricity market in the
Netherlands. According to ICE-ENRGY [18]: “A new total daily
volume record for Dutch Power futures across Dutch Power Baseload
and Dutch Power Peakload was also reached, with 3475 contracts
traded on November 25, 2014.”
2.2. APX spot market
The APX spot market consists of two separate markets: the
Day-Ahead Market (DAM) and the Intra-day market (IDM). DAM is
the larger of the two, and it is an auction type of market which
determines the day-ahead electricity prices for each 24 hours of
the next day. The second market, IDM, provides the participants
with the ability to adjust their spot positions up to 5 min before
the physical delivery of electricity. The Dutch IDM is coupled with
the Belgian and Nord Pool Intraday markets as of March 2013.
2.2.1. APX day-ahead market (DAM)
DAM is a spot market in which firms can buy/sell spot
electricity for physical delivery the next day. The format of the
DAM is a two-sided, double-blind auction. That is, both buyers and
sellers may place anonymous orders with different prices and
quantities on an hourly basis. Those orders result in demand and
supply curves for each hour of the next day [32,16]. There can be
different types of orders, such as limit orders and block orders.
Limit orders are single hourly orders with different price and
quantity pairs, whereas block orders are multiple consecutive
hourly orders. The market algorithm can accept limit orders
fractionally, but the block orders are either accepted or rejected
fully. Another type is profiled block orders, where the volume
varies over the different hours.
The DAM opens at midnight on the day before the delivery
(referred to as T1, in Fig. 2), and all participants can make bids
and offers for the delivery of electricity. Then, at 11:00 the TSOs
publish the Available Transmission Capacity (ATC), which indicates
how much capacity will be available during each hour of the
delivery day between different countries. At 12:00 the auction
closes and the inputs are used to start a matching algorithm called
COSMOS. The algorithm takes all bids from the participants and
uses the physical constraints imposed by the transmission lines
(both nationally and internationally) to come up with the best
clearing prices, maximizing social benefit (for more details see
[13]). The result of the auction is published at 12:55 on the APX
website and provides a reference for the other electricity markets.
Minimum and maximum prices on the DAM are 500 Euro/
MWh and 3000 Euro/MWh, respectively. APX is the central coun-
terparty for all trades; all contracts are traded anonymously, and
then cleared and settled on behalf of the members. Contracts
traded on the exchange are fully collateralized as all members are
required to pledge collaterals in the form of cash or letter of credit,
in excess of outstanding exposures at all times. Fig. 3 shows the
DAM in the timeline of electricity delivery.
T-n ENDEX T-2 ENDEX T-1 APX DAM T APX INTRADAY T+1
Delivery DayDay BeforeTwo Days Before After Delivery DayAll Days Before
Fig. 2. Futures/ENDEX in the timeline of electricity markets.
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2.2.2. APX intraday market
Since 2006, APX has also operated an intraday market. After the
DAM market closes, the hourly prices are announced to all market
participants. However, during the time between the determination
of the day-ahead positions and the physical delivery of electricity,
the market participants may decide to update their physical
positions. This can be done through the intra-day market.
The participants in this market can adjust their spot positions
up to 5 minutes before the physical delivery of electricity. The cost
of buying electricity in the intraday market is in general more
expensive than the day-ahead market. This market is open 24/7
and hence, with the new information the participants may adjust
their positions immediately. The minimum price is 99,999.90
Euro/MWh and the maximum price 99,999.90 Euro/MWh. Fig. 4
below shows IDM in the timeline of the electricity markets.
2.3. The imbalance market
Maintaining grid balance is one of the primary functions of
transmission system operators in liberalized electricity markets. In
this regard, management of reserve capacity (imbalance market)
both for additional electricity production and consumption is of
great importance [21,41]. Successful liberalization of the electricity
market requires creating an imbalance market (ancillary services)
that is well integrated with spot trading and transmission capacity
management [19]. In what follows, we first explain the details of
the imbalance market.
2.3.1. Electrical market details
The power grid needs to be in balance at all times, i.e., the
supply and demand of electricity must be equal in real time. When
there is a surplus of power in the system, the frequency of
electricity increases above the nominal value (50 Hz), and when
there is a shortage it decreases below this level. If these deviations
exceed a certain threshold then electrical equipments stop func-
tioning or power outages occur. Since it is difficult to change
electricity demand in real time, the steering is mostly done on the
supply side of the balance, i.e. generators are ramped up and down
to balance the fluctuation on the grid.
The TSO measures the imbalance of all PRPs based on their
submitted E-programs. If a PRP deviates from its E-program (the
total amount taken from or sent to the grid), TSO acts as an
artificial market participant who buys (sells) the excess (shortage)
electricity from (to) the PRP at a certain price in the imbalance
market. This price is unknown upfront and is highly volatile.
In practice, since demand and supply of electricity cannot be
accurately forecasted, there will always be some amount of
imbalance on the grid, and these imbalances need to be managed.
Therefore, the TSO has to ensure that it has customers that are
willing to buy electricity if there is a market surplus, and
producers who are willing to produce additional electricity when-
ever there is a market shortage. For this reason, TSO obligates the
large producers to make bids and offers to buy and sell electricity
in the imbalance market for every PTU. By placing bids in this
market a producer can communicate the capacity it is willing to
provide at the bid price. Hence, a buffer capacity is introduced for
the total market. To ensure the liquidity in this market, the law
obligates producers with more than 60 MWof production capacity
to make bids, and the TSO maintains yearly contracts for such
spare capacity. The details of this process will be described in the
next section. It is important to note that the balance is not
maintained by the TSO itself, but by using the bids that have been
submitted by the PRPs.
2.3.2. Imbalance market bid-ladder
The Dutch TSO, Tennet, organizes spare capacity in three
categories; short-term adjustment capacity, reserve capacity and
emergency capacity. Emergency capacity (EC) is obliged by law as
a certain percentage of total capacity that each plant has available.
This power is only called upon in emergency situations and it
overrules all other spare capacities. Reserve capacity (RC) and
Adjustment Capacity (AC) are both used to balance demand with
supply. However, there are a number of important differences.
First, RC takes longer to be activated than adjustment capacity. On
the other hand, AC is used immediately and has a maximum
response time of 30 s. In addition, RC is always called in full, i.e., if
a firm had placed an offer for 10 MWand if this offer is activated in
real time, then the full 10 MW is called for a specific amount of
time. AC on the other hand can be called upon partially, i.e., only
5 MW of the offer can be called upon.
Every PRP with a capacity of 60 MW or more has to make bids
for RC or AC, for which they are prepared to increase or decrease
production. Other PRPs can submit bids as well, though it is not
obligatory. These bids are used to construct the imbalance bid-
T-n ENDEX T-2 ENDEX T-1 APX DAM T APX INTRADAY T+1
4 PTEs in advance change bid on bidladder TenneT
8 PTEs in advance delivery of hour contract
Delivery DayDay BeforeTwo Days Before After Delivery DayAll Days Before
Fig. 4. IDM in timeline of electricity markets.
T-n ENDEX T-2 ENDEX T-1 APX DAM T APX INTRADAY T+1
00.00 11.00 12.00 13.05 13.05
Start bidding DAM ATC published DAM closes Results Auction DAM Intraday market opens
Delivery DayDay BeforeTwo Days Before After Delivery DayAll Days Before
Fig. 3. DAM/APX in the timeline of electricity markets.
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ladder, from which the TSO selects the party to increase or
decrease production. All bids are placed in multiples of 1 MW
and with a minimum size of 5 MW and maximum size of 200 MW.
Also, the speed of upscaling has to be at least 7% per minute of the
total offered capacity.
Fig. 5 shows the imbalance bid ladder in the Dutch Market on
10 April 2014 at 4:12 PM.
The figure above shows the bid-ladder for electricity at 4:12 PM
on April 10, 2014. The lines indicate the current price that is asked
for a certain increase/decrease in the supply of electricity. Each
line represents a certain amount of electricity in the ladder. For
instance, an increase of 100 Euro/MWh will cost 61 Euros at 11:00,
while a 300 MW correction will cost 200 Euro/MWh. The result is
a bid-ladder for every PTU fromwhich electricity can be bought or
sold. The price of additional electricity increases exponentially as
the total shortage increases. On the other hand, the price received
for electricity decreases as total surplus increases, it can even
become negative.
2.3.3. Ex-post calculation of the imbalance cost
After the physical delivery of electricity, imbalance amounts
and the costs are calculated. This event is shown below in Fig. 6 on
he timeline of electricity transactions.
As stated in the previous section, the TSO constructs a bid-ladder
through which it can buy additional electricity and sell excess
electricity whenever it is needed. Every 15 min, the TSO measures
the total imbalance that is present at every connection to the high
voltage grid. Then, looking at these individual imbalances a market
imbalance is constructed. This is the additional supply/demand that
the TSO has to arrange in the imbalance market by activating the bids
from the bid-ladder. This process is shown schematically in Fig. 7.
The TSO buys or sells the electricity using the bid-ladder. Every
minute the TSO publishes the current amount of electricity that is
sold or bought and the marginal price at which this is happening.
This is a tool for market participants to monitor what the state of
the market is, and to enable them to change their bids, based on
developments of the market.
Fig. 8 shows the realized imbalance prices on April 10, 2014.
The horizontal axis shows the PTUs indicating a specific time. The
vertical axis shows the cost of imbalance at that specific moment.
There are two prices, one that is used to settle a shortage (the red
square) and one used to settle an overage (the blue diamond). The
highest marginal bid to buy and lowest marginal bid to sell are
used as the settlement price. All costs are quoted in EUR/MWh.
The calculation of the net cost to each PRP is based on a 15-min
interval. First, the TSO calculates the total amount of net imbalance
that occurred at each PRP. This results in a specific amount taken from
the TSO or supplied to the TSO from that PRP. Second, the TSO looks at
T-n ENDEX T-2 ENDEX T-1 APX DAM T APX INTRADAY T+1
Delivery DayDay BeforeTwo Days Before After Delivery DayAll Days Before
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Fig. 5. Price bid ladder as published on 10 April 2014 at 4:12 PM [38].
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the bids and offers activated, and uses the highest bid that was paid
for additional electricity and the lowest bid activated to sell electricity.
These two prices are used to pay the suppliers of demand and
capacity.
Based on the direction of imbalance there are 4 regulation
states in each PTU (see Table 1). If the regulation state is zero,
then no additional electricity is bought or sold. In this case, small
imbalances are settled using the average price when buying and
selling. Hence, a ‘fair’ price is used that does not deviate
significantly from the current market price. When the regulation
state is ‘1’ or ‘þ1’, the TSO needs to buy or sell additional
electricity exclusively. This means that the market had deviated
advantageously to one side only. If this is the situation, all
imbalances are settled using a single price. Therefore, in this
regulation state there are both winners and losers. The winners
are the PRPs that had an imbalance that was opposite of the
market imbalance. When the market has shortage of electricity,
the parties with excess electricity will sell their excess to the TSO
at a high price, making a profit on their excess imbalance. On the
other hand, the parties with a shortage will pay a high price to
recover their shortage.
Finally, if the regulation state is a ‘2’, then both corrections
happen, and both buying of electricity from the TSO and selling
electricity to the TSO take place at a cost compared to the market
price. Note that selling to the TSO may even result in a negative
price, indicating that additional money needs to be paid for
delivering electricity. This pricing behavior is shown in Fig. 9.
After the regulation state and the resulting prices have been
determined, all PRPs are charged for their net imbalances. A PRP
that has multiple connections only pays for the net imbalance.
Netting the imbalance over time is not possible. The profit that the
TSO earns on these transactions (small deviations are possible) is
returned to the market participants in the form of discounts in the
next year. Hence, the TSO does not profit from these transactions
and the imbalance market offers a zero-sum game.
3. Quantitative analysis of APX spot and imbalance prices
In this section, we provide a quantitative analysis of day-ahead
spot and imbalance prices for the Dutch electricity market.
3.1. Overview of spot prices
We first plot the DAM spot prices between 1/1/2002 and 4/9/
2011 in Fig. 10 below. We observe that, similar to other commod-
ities, the prices have a strong tendency to revert to mean. In
addition, multiple price spikes are apparent, which are mainly
caused by low temperatures during the winter period, and
droughts during the summer period (Boogert and Dupont [4]).
Next, in Fig. 11 we plot the average prices for each of the 24 h of
the day. The figure demonstrates that the spot prices are more
likely to spike during the early morning and early evening, i.e., the
standard deviation of the price also increases during peak hours.
From Fig. 11 it is clear that the average spot prices and the
volatility of the prices tend to rise during peak hours and decline
during off-peak hours. The difference between the mean and
median spot prices also increases during the peak hours indicating
large spikes during these hours. The occurrence of spikes during
the peak hours is not very surprising since the market demand
approaches to available total capacity during these hours.
We next analyze the frequency of price spikes (i.e., prices above
or below a certain standard deviations of the mean price) for each
hour of the day in Fig. 12. We observe that upward price spikes
tend to happen between 6–11 AM and 5–7 PM. This pattern can be
explained by Dutch working habits, industrial production and
electricity generation capacity and technology during these hours.
In particular, in the mornings energy consumption suddenly
ramps-up as people wake up and start their work. The same line
of argument also applies at the end of the day when people are
returning home from work.
Table 1
Overview of different regulation states recognized by Tennet.
Regulation State Description
0 No shortage and surplus in the system
þ1 Tennet has been buying additional electricity exclusively; or, Tennet has been continuously upscaling
1 Tennet has been selling additional electricity exclusively; or Tennet has been downscaling continuously




















Fig. 8. The imbalance prices per PTU on 10 April 2014 [39]. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 9. Imbalance management.
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Fig. 11. Overview of main statistics for the hourly spot prices between 1/1/2002 and 4/9/2011.
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Downward spikes also occur. However, as expected, downward
spikes are less often and smaller in magnitude. They occur only in
off-peak hours, when production is plentiful and demand is at its
lowest level.
3.2. Overview of imbalance prices
Imbalance prices are paid and received by PRPs who deviate
from their E-programs. PRPs with deficits buy electricity from the
system so they have to pay a settlement price for their imbalances.
Similarly, PRPs with surpluses are overfeeding electricity into
system so they receive additional payment (which can be nega-
tive) because of their surpluses. However, the settlement prices
can substantially fluctuate depending on the system balance itself.
In particular, if the overall market is in deficit, then this can be
beneficial to PRPs with surpluses. They can settle for their
surpluses well above the day-ahead market prices in the imbal-
ance market. However, PRPs with deficits could suffer because of
these high prices. The reverse logic applies when the overall
market has a surplus. In Fig. 13, we show imbalance prices
between 01/01/2002 and 12/31/2013. We observe that the prices
can occasionally become negative. This indicates a large surplus of
supply during these hours.
It is also of interest to investigate the frequency of overall market
overages and shortages. Our analyses reveal that, during the last 12
years, 47% of the time the system had an overage (regulation state
þ1) and 34% of the time the system had a shortage (regulation state
1). In addition 18% of the time, both cases happened at the same
PTU (regulation state 2). Finally, 1% of the time the system was in
balance and no additional trading was needed in the imbalance
market (regulation state 0). These figures indicate that system
overages happen significantly more often than shortages indicating
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Fig. 12. Frequency of price spikes for each hour of the day between 1/1/2002 and 4/9/2011.
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that the market, on average, tends to buy more than what is
necessary. This could be explained by the skewness of the prices
together with the risk attitude of the market participants. In
particular, prices are positively skewed implying larger upward price
spikes relative to downward spikes. This leads the market partici-
pants to take excess positions relative to the mean demand. In what
follows we further explore buying (taking from the system) and
selling (feeding to the system) prices in the imbalance market.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of hourly imbalance prices.
There are two prices in the imbalance market: one is to take (buy)
from the system and the other is to feed (sell) to the system. For all
hours of the day, taking from the system has a higher mean price
and standard deviation than feeding to the system. The average
price for taking from the system was 52 EUR/MWh while the price
for feeding to the system was 42.2 EUR/MWh.
In addition, when we compare imbalance prices with the DAM
spot prices, we observe that on average, taking from the system is
4.94 EUR/MWh higher than the day-ahead market prices whereas
feeding to system is 4.79 EUR/MWh lower than the day-ahead
prices. These are the average risk premiums in the imbalance
market relative to the day-ahead market. Unlike usual commodity
and stock markets we observe two risk-premiums one for selling
and one for buying electricity in the imbalance market. This is
because 18% of the time the system observes a regulation state 2 in
which buying and selling prices diverge. This happens because in
regulation state 2 both an overage and underage happens during
the same PTU and the system operator both buys and sells
electricity at different prices.
Finally, we show the frequency of 3-sigma and higher price
spikes in the imbalance market in Fig. 14. Price spikes for taking
Table 2
Overview of main statistics for the hourly imbalance prices both for taking from the system and feeding to the system in EUR/MWh between 1/1/2002 and 12/31/2013.
Summary statistics for taking from the system Summary statistics for feeding to the system
Hours Mean Min Med. Max S.D. Skew. Hours Mean Min Med. Max S.D. Skew.
0 38.8 345.7 33.0 600.0 59.6 2.4 0 27.0 450.7 21.8 600.0 53.5 2.1
1 34.9 422.3 32.0 600.0 46.6 3.4 1 28.5 422.3 25.6 600.0 43.3 2.9
2 30.8 256.0 30.6 600.0 31.6 3.6 2 27.2 256.0 26.8 600.0 29.8 2.7
3 28.2 299.6 29.0 488.4 26.3 0.9 3 25.6 356.7 25.8 488.4 25.9 0.4
4 27.4 460.0 28.0 499.6 31.7 0.5 4 23.0 460.0 22.1 499.6 30.9 0.2
5 34.6 449.6 30.3 750.0 57.2 2.1 5 23.5 449.6 19.0 750.0 52.5 1.4
6 50.3 355.6 36.2 750.0 90.9 1.4 6 30.3 359.6 18.0 1036.6 85.3 1.4
7 67.5 345.6 46.9 999.0 106.6 1.3 7 45.6 351.6 28.1 999.0 103.6 1.5
8 66.2 378.0 48.0 1784.0 93.1 3.2 8 51.8 378.0 36.6 1784.0 90.2 2.9
9 68.4 254.4 50.0 1784.0 83.0 5.3 9 60.6 254.4 41.8 1784.0 80.7 5.6
10 70.7 200.0 50.0 1784.0 88.0 5.8 10 65.8 253.5 45.2 1784.0 86.9 6.0
11 63.8 417.2 47.0 1784.0 79.3 6.6 11 59.3 417.2 41.8 1784.0 77.6 6.9
12 62.4 200.0 45.1 1963.5 79.9 7.1 12 57.9 200.0 40.0 1963.5 79.1 7.3
13 59.2 298.6 43.6 1963.5 76.9 7.7 13 54.9 298.6 39.1 1963.5 75.6 8.1
14 54.1 250.5 40.2 1903.2 73.5 9.0 14 50.3 250.5 36.5 1903.2 72.3 9.4
15 50.7 200.0 39.4 1984.0 69.6 11.4 15 45.7 200.0 34.6 1984.0 67.0 12.2
16 52.8 250.5 40.0 1984.0 75.7 7.8 16 45.7 251.5 33.9 1984.0 74.2 8.7
17 68.4 250.5 42.6 1435.0 103.9 4.0 17 57.1 251.5 34.7 1435.0 99.4 4.3
18 63.6 250.1 43.6 903.3 81.4 3.0 18 53.9 250.1 36.3 903.3 76.3 3.3
19 59.5 408.6 43.0 840.1 72.8 2.9 19 48.5 408.6 34.6 840.1 67.9 3.2
20 50.8 408.2 37.4 750.0 65.4 2.7 20 38.9 408.2 29.3 750.0 58.5 2.8
21 49.6 359.1 36.0 750.0 68.7 2.6 21 36.1 359.1 27.0 750.0 60.4 2.5
22 51.2 389.7 35.0 750.0 83.1 2.5 22 33.0 389.7 22.9 750.0 69.9 2.5
23 43.3 389.7 33.1 750.0 74.8 2.1 23 23.5 389.7 18.0 662.0 61.9 1.5
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Fig. 14. Frequency diagram of number of significant deviations of more than 3 sigma of that specific hour based on data from the imbalance market from 01/2002–12/2013.
F. Tanrisever et al. / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 51 (2015) 1363–13741372
from the system has a similar pattern with feeding to the system.
Prices for taking from the system tend to generate more upward
spikes than the prices for feeding to the system. Similar to the day-
ahead market, upward spikes also occur from 6 to 10 AM and from
5 to 7 PM. This pattern can be explained by the power-up and
power-down phases of the working day.
In addition, although day-ahead market prices do not present
any downward spikes below three standard deviations of the
mean; the imbalance market does have such spikes. This makes
the imbalance market prices more volatile than the day-ahead
prices. These downward spikes happen only in off-peak hours
when the demand is very low.
4. Discussion
We examined the organization and the functioning of the
liberalized Dutch electricity markets including the futures, day-
ahead, intra-day and imbalance markets. First, we described the
liberalization and the organization of the Dutch electricity supply
chain and the role of the main market participants including the
transmission system operator, distribution system operators, pro-
gram responsible parties and metering companies. We then
delineated the organization of financial trading and clearing
mechanism of electricity through the organized futures exchange
(The European Energy Derivatives Exchange), and the spot market
(Amsterdam Power Exchange) which includes the day-ahead
market and intra-day markets. We also detailed the functioning
of the imbalance market and reserve capacity management in the
Netherlands.
We also conducted an exploratory analysis of the Dutch
electricity prices in the day-ahead and imbalance markets. We
observed that price spikes both in the day-ahead and imbalance
markets usually occur around 6–10 AM and 5–7 PM. Nevertheless,
the imbalance prices are significantly more volatile than the day-
ahead prices. In particular, although day-ahead market prices do
not present any downward spikes below three standard deviations
of the mean, the imbalance market does have such spikes.
A close examination of the imbalance market revealed that
during the last 12 years, 47% of the time the system had an overage
(regulation state þ1) and 34% of the time the system had a
shortage (regulation state 1). In addition 18% of the time, both
cases happened at the same PTU (regulation state 2). Finally, 1% of
the time the system was in balance and no additional trading was
needed in the imbalance market (regulation state 0). These figures
conclude that system overages happened significantly more often
than shortages, pointing out that the market tends to buy more
than what is necessary. This could be explained by the skewness
of the prices together with the risk attitude of the market
participants.
On the other hand, there are two prices in the imbalance
market: one is to take (buy) from the system and the other is to
feed (sell) to the system. The average price for taking from the
systemwas 52 EUR/MWh while the price for feeding to the system
was 42.2 EUR/MWh. When we compared these figures with the
average DAM spot prices, we observed that on average, taking
from the system is 4.94 EUR/MWh higher than the day-ahead
market prices whereas feeding to system is 4.79 EUR/MWh lower
than the day-ahead prices. These are the average risk premiums in
the imbalance market relative to the day-ahead market. Unlike
usual commodity and stock markets we observed two risk-
premiums; one for selling and one for buying electricity in the
imbalance market. This is because 18% of the time the system
observes a regulation state 2 in which buying and selling prices
diverge.
Whenwe look at the spot and imbalance prices as a time series,
we also observe a clear reduction is price spikes and average prices
during the course of the liberalization efforts. Especially during
early 2000s there were frequent spikes in prices which may be
attributed to the fast transition in the electricity markets. This is in
agreement with the predictions of Joskow [19]. As the transition of
the electricity markets are completed by early 2010s, the price
spikes gradually disappeared. This is also in line with the increased
liquidity and trading volume in spot and futures markets.
5. Conclusions and policy implications
Our analysis reveals key insights to the market participants as
well as the policy makers in the Dutch electricity market. These
implications are summarized as follows.
Implications on risk management for market participants and
policy makers: We observe that upward price spikes in the day-
ahead market usually occur during the peak hours while the
downward spikes usually occur during the off-peak hours. This
implies that the hedging behavior of the market participants
would be different during off-peak and peak hours.
The risk in the day-ahead market can be hedged using the
futures market. In particular, risk-averse market participants
would demand more protection during the peak hours relative
to off-peak hours. This would lead the firms to over-hedge (more
than the expected physical exposure) during the peak-hours and
under-hedge (less than the expected physical exposure) during the
off-peak hours. An appropriate over-hedging policy for the peak-
hours can be constructed using the Dutch Power Peak Load
contracts in the futures market. However, the Dutch futures
market does not provide futures contracts delivering exclusively
during the off-peak hours. Instead there is a Dutch Power Base
Load contract which delivers during all 24 h of the day. Hence, the
firms can only use Dutch Power Base Load contracts to hedge their
off-peak hour risks in the day-ahead market. However, since these
contracts are not exactly tailored to off-peak hours, they are not
efficient for hedging the risk for the off-peak hours. In this regard,
introducing off-peak-hours futures contracts would benefit the
market participants. Nevertheless, the policy makers face a
dilemma here. Although introducing such contracts would better
hedge the risk during the off-peak hours, it will, however, reduce
the liquidity of the base load contracts.
Market participants and policy makers should be more cautious
about upward price spikes than downward price spikes: We observe
that upward price spikes occur more often than downward price
spikes in the electricity markets. In addition, we observe numer-
ous upward price spikes above three standard deviation of the
mean price in the day-ahead market. However, there were no
downward price spikes below three standard deviation of the
mean. This implies that a short position in the day-ahead market is
riskier than a long position for the market participants.
Imbalance market is significantly more risky than the day-ahead
market: The magnitude of price spikes in the imbalance market is
much larger than the magnitude of the spikes in the day-ahead
market. In addition, the risk premium for the imbalance market
relative to the day-ahead-market is around 10%. Hence, trading
electricity the imbalance market is both more risky and expensive
in the imbalance market relative to day-ahead market. This
implies that the risk-averse market participants should use the
imbalance market as a last resort when trading electricity.
The market tends to over-buy in the imbalance market: In
particular, during the last 12 years, 47% of the time the system
had an overage (regulation state þ1) and 34% of the time the
system had a shortage (regulation state 1). This implies that the
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market participants are more worried about an upward price spike
than a downward price spike.
The average price of buying and selling electricity diverges in the
imbalance market: During the last 12 years, 18% of the time buying
and selling prices during a PTU were different. This happens when
the market experiences both an overage and underage during a
PTU. We expect that as the renewable's share in electricity
generation increases, the frequency of such regulation states will
increase, as the volume of renewable generation is highly volatile.
To mitigate this issue, the policy makers may reduce the PTU size.
With the completion of the liberalization of the electricity
markets, the volatility of spot and imbalance electricity prices have
decreased. Hence liberalized markets in the Netherlands provided
the investors and other market participants with a more stable
economic environment in which they can better forecast future
prices and evaluate investment plans. According to World Economic
Forum the Netherlands scores 0.88 in energy access and security
index and ranked among the top countries in the world [42].
References
[1] APX, 2014. APX group power spot exchange, aggregated curves. 〈http://www.
apxgroup.com/market-results/apx-power-nl/aggregated-curves/〉.
[2] Argueso J. From regional markets to a single European market. In: Proceedings
of the 7th international conference on the European Energy Market (EEM),
IEEE; 2010.
[3] Boisseleau F. The role of power exchanges for the creation of a single European
electricity market: market design and market regulation. The Netherlands:
Univerisite Paris IX Dauphine, Delft University Press; 2004.
[4] Boogert, Alexander, Dominique Dupont. The nature of supply side effects on
electricity prices: The impact of water temperature. Economics Letters
2005;88(1):121–5.
[5] Botterud A, Kristiansen T, Ilic MD. The relationship between spot and futures
prices in the Nord Pool electricity market. Energy Econ. 2010;32(5):967–78.
[6] Damme EV. Liberalizing the Dutch electricity market: 1998–2004. Energy J.
2005:155–79.
[7] De Nooij M, Baarsma B. Divorce comes at a price: an ex ante welfare analysis of
ownership unbundling of the distribution and commercial companies in the
Dutch energy sector. Energy Policy 2009;37(12):5449–58.
[8] Deng SJ, Oren SS. Electricity derivatives and risk management. Energy 2006;31
(6):940–53.
[9] Derinkuyu K. On the determination of European day ahead electricity prices:
the Turkish case. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 2015;244(3):980–9.
[10] Derinkuyu K, Tanrisever F, Baytugan F, Sezgin M. Combinatorial auctions in
Turkish day ahead electricity market. In: Sabuncuoglu I, Kara BY, Bidanda. B,
editors. Industrial engineering applications in emerging countries. CRC Press;
2015. p. 49–64.
[11] ENDEX A. Power market instrument specifications v4.0. Amsterdam: APX
ENDEX; 2011.
[12] ENDEX A. Price settlement procedure. Amsterdam: APX ENDEX; 2014.
[13] EPEXSPOT. 2014. 〈http://static.epexspot.com/document/20015/COSMOS_pub
lic_description.pdf〉.
[14] Hall, 2014. 〈http://www.platts.com/latest-news/electric-power/brussels/eu-ex
changes-plan-intraday-power-market-coupling-26695758〉, 2012.
[15] Haldrup, Niels, Morten Ørregaard Nielsen. A regime switching long memory
model for electricity prices. Journal of econometrics 2006;135(1):349–76.
[16] Hortacsu A, Puller SL. Understanding strategic bidding in multi-unit auctions:
a case study of the Texas electricity spot market. RAND J. Econ. 2008;39
(1):86–114.
[17] Hunt S. Making competition work in electricity. New York: John Wiley&Sons,
Inc.; 2002.
[18] ICE-ENRGY. 2014. 〈http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20141126005340/
en/ICE-Endex-Achieves-Daily-Volume-Records-TTF#.VQqF201WE6Y〉.
[19] Joskow P. Lessons learned from electricity market liberalization. Energy J.
2008;29(2):9–42.
[20] Kemfert C, Barbu D, Kalashnikov V. Economic effects of the liberalization of
the European electricity market – simulation results of a gam theoretic
modeling concept. IEWT Internationale Energiewirtschaftstagung Wien,
Vienna; 2003.
[21] Klessmann C, Nabe C, Burges K. Pros and cons of exposing renewables to
electricity market risks—a comparison of the market integration approaches in
Germany, Spain, and the UK. Energy Policy 2008;36(10):3646–61.
[22] Kristiansen T. Pricing of monthly forward contracts in the Nord Pool market.
Energy Policy 2007;35(1):307–16.
[23] Looijestijn-Clearie A. Breaking up is hard to do: Dutch unbundling legislation
and the free movement of capital. Eur. Bus. Organ. Law Rev. 2014;15
(03):337–55.
[24] Madani M, Van Vyve M. Computationally efficient MIP formulation and
algorithms for European day-ahead electricity market auctions. Eur. J. Oper.
Res. 2015;242(2):580–93.
[25] Martin A, Müller JC, Pokutta S. Strict linear prices in non-convex European
day-ahead electricity markets. Optimization Methods Softw. 2014;29
(1):189–221.
[26] Meeus L, Vandezande L, Cole S, Belmans R. Market coupling and the
importance of price coordination between power exchanges. Energy
2009;34:228–34.
[27] Möller, Christoph, Svetlozar T. Rachev, Frank J. Fabozzi. Balancing energy
strategies in electricity portfolio management. Energy Economics 2011;33(1):
2-11.
[28] Soares I, Sarmento P. Does unbundling really matter? The telecommunications
and electricity cases (No. 380). Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia
do Porto; 2010.
[29] Squicciarini G, Cervigni G, Perekhodtsev D, Poletti C. The integration of the
European electricity markets at a turning point: from the regional model to
the Third Legislative Package. 2010.
[30] Steiner F. Regulation, industry structure, and performance in the electricity
supply industry. 2000. Available at SSRN 223648.
[31] Streimikiene D, Bruneckiene J, Cibinskiene A. The review of electricity market
liberalization impacts on electricity prices. Transform. Bus. Econ.
2013;12:40–60.
[32] Swider DJ. Simultaneous bidding in day-ahead auctions for spot energy and
power systems reserve. Int. J. Electr. Power Energy Syst. 2007;29(6):470–9.
[33] Tanrisever F, Derinkuyu K, Heeren M. Forecasting electricity infeed for
distribution system networks: an analysis of the Dutch case. Energy
2013;58:247–57.
[34] Tennet. The imbalance pricing system as at 01-01-2001, revised per 26-10-
2005. Tennet. 2010.
[35] Tennet. Preparation of E-programmes & T-forecast. 2010. 〈http://www.Tennet.
eu/nl/about-Tennet/news-press-publications/publications/technical-publica
tions/preparation-e-programmes-and-t-forecasts.html〉.
[36] Tennet. Tennet primary reserves. 2013. 〈http://www.Tennet.org/english/opera
tional_management/ system_data_preparation/primary_reserve.aspx〉.
[37] Tennet. Transmission Capacity Outlook 2014. 2014. 〈http://www.Tennet.org/
controls/DownloadDocument.ashx?documentID=11〉.
[38] Tennet. Bid price ladder. 2014. 〈http://www.tennet.org/english/operational_
management/system_data_preparation/offering_regulating_reserve_capacity/
bid_price_ladder.aspx〉.
[39] Tennet. Imbalance prices. 2014. 〈http://www.tennet.org/english/operational_
management/System_data_relating_processing/settlement_prices/index.
aspx〉.
[40] TSOs AE. Intraday cross border The Netherlands – Belgium. Amsterdam: APX
ENDEX; 2010.
[41] Vandezande L, Meeus L, Belmans R, Saguan M, Glachant JM. Well-functioning
balancing markets: a prerequisite for wind power integration. Energy Policy
2010;38(7):3146–54.
[42] WEF. The global energy architecture performance index report 2015. 2015.
〈http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalEnergyArchitecture_2015.pdf〉.
[43] Wenting F. Programmaverantwoordelijkheid. Arnhem: Tennet; 2002.
[44] Woo CK, Lloyd D, Tishler A. Electricity market reform failures: UK, Norway,
Alberta and California. Energy policy 2003;31(11):1103–15.
F. Tanrisever et al. / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 51 (2015) 1363–13741374
